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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

BRIEF OFi APPELLANT

:

ALLEN F. RICE,

Case N o .

Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF 'THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction

for the offenses

of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a misdemeanor,
and Unlawful Possession

:>f a Contro 1 ] ed Substance with Intent

to Distribute for Value, a felony, both in violation ~f

Title

58, Chapter 3 7 , Section 8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
and Driving on Suspensioi i, a misdemeanor, i i vIo 1 at ioi i of Ti 11e
41, Chapter 1 2 , Section 3 2 , Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended,
in the First Judicial District Court, i i I and. for Cache County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Venoy Christophersoii, Judge presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
P1. Rice, was charged by

Appellant, Allen
with the

offenses

of

nlawfu!

Possession

of

Information

a

Controlled

Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value, a felony, Unlawful
Possess ion of

a Cc >n tiro J 1 eel Si lbs tance , a misdemeanor - . b th in

violation of Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-3
and Driving on Suspension,
Code Anno t a te• :i, § 41 ] 2 3

f! QC ^

a

amended)

: misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
9 5 3 a s amei id ed ) »

I ! ie

ca s e

was

tried to a jury, on April 16, 17, 18 and 19, 1985.

Appellant

was convicted of all the offenses, as charged in the Information.
On May 6, 1985, appellant was ordered to serve an indeterminate
sentence of not more

than fifteen years

in the Utah State

Prison for the felony conviction and serve 30 days in jail for
the offense of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance
and pay a $150 fine for the offense of Driving on Suspension.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an order from this court suppressing
certain evidence, reversing the judgments and convictions rendered against him for the charges of Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled Substance and Unlawful Possession of a Controlled
Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value, and remanding
the case to the First District Court for a new trial.

In the

alternative, appellant seeks to have the judgment and conviction
for the offense of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance
with Intent to Distribute for Value reversed and a judgment of
acquittal ordered.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues raised

in this appeal are:

Whether law

enforcement officers violated appellant's constitutional right
against unreasonable

searches and

seizures by searching his

vehicle?; and whether the evidence was sufficient to establish
the element of the intent to distribute for value in the offense

of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute for value?
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant, Allen F. Rice, was the subject of an ongoing
narcotics investigation instituted by Cache County Sheriff's detectives.

(Tr. at Suppression Hearing at 76)1

As a result

of this investigation the detectives in charge of the case had
learned that:
license had

appellant lived in Salt Lake City, his driver's

been

suspended

for

failure

to prove

financial

responsibility, and he regularly visited his parents in Logan
on Wednesdays.

(Tr. P. 79, Tr. S. 6, 34, 54)

On Wednesday,

December 7, 1984, as part of this investigation, Sergeant Sid
Groll and Detective Brad Blair were conducting surveillance in
Logan City, near appellant's parent's home.

The primary reason

they were in that area was to see if appellant was in the Cache
Valley.

(Tr. P. 78, Tr. S. 79)
While having a drink at a service station the detectives

observed appellant drive by in his truck.

They decided to stop

him for the offense of driving on a suspended or revoked driver's
license.

(Tr. P. 79, Tr. S. 14)

detectives hoped

to

further

their

By making such a stop, the
investigation

by meeting

1. Transcripts of three separate proceedings have been made
part of the record on appeal: the trial, the suppression hearing
and the preliminary hearing. These transcripts had not been
numbered consecutively, so for the purposes of this brief
appellant has designated the transcripts in the following
manner: Transcript of Preliminary Hearing: Tr. P.? Transcript
of Suppression Hearing: Tr. S.; Transcript of trial: Tr.;

appellant face to face*

(Tr. S. 16)

They also stated that

there was a possibility that contraband may be found.

(Tr. S.

29, 80)
The detectives, who were
signaled appellant to pull over.

an unmarked

car,

He then pulled into a parking

lot behind a law office in Logan.
Tr. 103)

driving

(Tr. P. 81, Tr. S. 14, 48,

Appellant was informed that he was being arrested for

driving on suspension, at which time he requested that he be
allowed to leave the vehicle at his mother's house. (Tr.S. 31,
56)"

When that request was denied appellant then asked if he

could lock his luggage in the cab of the truck and leave it in
the parking

lot.

(Tr. S. 56)

Sergeant Groll denied those

requests and gave appellant only two options: to allow one of
the detectives to drive the truck to the Sheriff's office, or
to have the truck

searched

and towed

(Tr. P. 64, 69, Tr. S. 56, Tr. 105)
allow Sergeant Groll
department.

to drive

from the parking lot.
The appellant opted to

the vehicle to the Sheriff's

(Tr.P. 60, Tr.S. 31, Tr. 105)

At the Sheriff's office the detective consulted with
patrol officers to determine what procedure to follow in impound
searches and to obtain the proper forms to conduct the search.
(Tr. S. 83, Tr. 110)

Sergeant Groll

justified his need to

conduct an inventory of the vehicle because he had driven the
vehicle and did not want to be the victim of a theft claim.
(Tr. P. 59, 85, Tr. 110)

Appellant was not informed of the

necessity of such a search until it had been completed.
P. 59)

(Tr.

During the course of the inventory the detectives found

four ounces of cocaine in a paper bag inside the truck, a vile
containing cocaine and a canister of marijuana in a camera case
in the truck along with assorted depressant-type pharmacutical
drugs in a suitcase.

(Tr. 112)

At trial witnesses for the State testified that based on
the quantity, quality and packaging of the cocaine, it appeared
that appellant was intending to distribute it to others.

(Tr.

303-306, 332, 533-535) Defense witnesses offered testimony to
the contrary indicating that in this case, the method of packaging
and the location of the drugs were insignificant, and that the
quantity was consistent with the amount that may be possessed
by a "heavy" cocaine user.

(Tr. 372-375, 471-477)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The inventory of appellant's vehicle was conducted as
a pretext to the detectives' ongoing narcotics investigation
and not to further any of the policies that courts have found
to be

reasonable

Likewise, the

grounds

refusal

by

for

upholding

detectives

inventory searches.

to allow

appellant

to

either leave his vehicle at the scene of the arrest or turn it
over to a third person makes any subsequent inventory or search
of that vehicle unreasonable.

The second issue raised on appeal

is that there was insufficient evidence presented by the state
to establish the element of intent to distribute for value.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INVENTORY OF APPELLANT'S VEHICLE VIOLATED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AS IT
WAS A PRETEXT TO AN INVESTIGATORY SEARCH.
FURTHERMORE, PROPER PROCEDURES WERE NOT
FOLLOWED IN TAKING CUSTODY OF THE VEHICLE
WHICH ALSO MADE THE SEARCH UNREASONABLE.
Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to suppress
evidence seized during the course of the inventory search of
his vehicle.

(R. 17)

motion was denied
court.

An evidentiary hearing was held and the

in a written opinion issued by the trial

(R. 110-114)

The motion was reviewed

at trial and

objections were made to the introduction of the evidence seized
as required by State v. Leslie, 672 P.2d 79 (Ut. 1983).

(Tr.

4, 337)
In its rulings on the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has established two requirements that must be met before the fruits
of a search may be used against a defendant:

(1) the search

must be reasonable; and (2) the search must be made pursuant to
a valid warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
If there is no warrant, there are specific exceptions in which
the Court has allowed warrantless searches to be conducted.2
The exception relied upon by the State in this case is that of
an inventory

search of a vehicle.

South Dakota v. Opperman,

428 U.S. 364, (1976) .
2. This court has established the same requirements for Article
I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah, State v. Hygh, 16
U.A.R. 10 (Ut. 1985).

The important aspect of all of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment is that the scope
of any warrantless search is to be limited by the policies that
justify it.

The justification that the court gave in Opperman

for the inventory search of a vehicle were four fold:

(1) to

determine if the automobile is stolen; (2) to protect the police
from potential danger; (3) to protect the owner's property from
theft or vandalism; and (4) to protect the police against claims
for lost or stolen property.

In upholding the inventory in

Opperman the Court described two prerequisites that must be
met:

First the search must be made pursuant to standardized

procedures.

Secondly, the search must not be a pretext of an

investigatory search.3
A
THE INVENTORY IN THIS CASE WAS A PRETEXT TO
AN INVESTIGATORY SEARCH.
The threshold

issue in this

case

is whether this

inventory search was really a pretext to the ongoing narcotics
investigation.

In making this determination, the courts look

to the totality of all the circumstances of the arrest and
search.

The factors that the courts have found to be important

are: whether the arrestee was a suspect in a different offense
or investigation; whether

standard

procedures

were

followed

during the course of the search; and the location of the vehicle

3. These same requirements have been placed on vehicle inventories conducted under Article If Section 14 of the Constitution
of Utah, State v. Hygh, supra.

at the time the search was conducted.*
In State v. Stockert, 245 NW2d 266 (N.D. 1976), the
court found the inventory search of the defendant's vehicle,
after an arrest for a traffic violation, was a pretext to a
narcotics investigation.

In that case, the arrest and search

were not conducted by patrolmen but, as in this case, by narcotics officers.

Blazak v. Eyman, 399 F.Supp. 40

(D.C. Ariz.

1971), involved a situation where the police received an anonymous tip that the defendant was smoking marijuana. The officers,
before leaving the station, received a teletyped message that
the defendant's

driver's

license

had

been

suspended.

The

defendant was arrested for driving on suspension, his car was
searched and marijuana

was

found.

The

court

rejected

the

state's claim that this was a search incident to arrest and
found that the traffic arrest was a pretext

to search the

vehicle to further the narcotics investigation.

A major factor

in the court's decision was that the defendant was never charged
with the

alleged

traffic

violation.

Likewise, in State v.

Phifer, 254 S.E.2d 586 (NC 1979), the defendant was stopped for
speeding.

A second officer arrived on the scene and informed

the first officer that the defendant was a known drug dealer.
A warrant

check

was conducted

and outstanding

other traffic offenses were discovered.

warrants for

The court found that

the officer's decision to request a warrant check followed by

4. See generally, LeFave, Search and Seizure, A Treatise on the
Fourth Amendment, 1978 §7.5(e).

Q

his unilateral decision to impound the car, after learning that
the defendant was a drug dealer, indicated that the inventory
was a pretext to search the defendant's car for contraband.
In the instant case, detective Blair testified that
over the last four and one half years he had been a detective
involved in follow-up investigations of criminal offenses other
than traffic offenses.

He had not been assigned to duty as a

traffic patrolman in that period of time.

(Tr.S. 4)

Blair

also stated that he and Sergeant Groll were specifically looking
for appellant

and

his truck

on that

evening.

(Tr.S.

8-9)

He then described their reasons for stopping appellant:
A. I had no knowledge that he'd have
drugs and stuff with him, but I knew that
there could have been a possibility. From
what I'd heard there could have been a
possibility he did have that.
[Emphasis
added]
Q.

On that very night?

A. Yes.
Q. And it's also true, Mr. Blair,
that this is part of the reason you pulled
him over?
A. Part of the reason, yes.
(Tr.S. 17)
As described by Sergeant Groll, the detectives had,
for several weeks, been formulating a plan to stop appellant
for driving on suspension as part of their narcotics investigation:
Q. Had you on any occasion prior to
stopping Mr. Rice discussed the option of
stopping him for driving on suspension?

A.

Yes.

Q.

When would that have been?

A. Probably two to four weeks prior
to that night.
Q.
A.
Blair.

And with whom was that discussion?
It was discussed

with Detective

Q. Was Mr. Rice a subject of investigation by the Cache County Sheriff's
Office on December 7, at least as of that
date?
A. Yes, sir, he was.
(Tr.S. 66)
The detective admitted that other options of obtaining a search
warrant or making a controlled narcotics buy were considered.
(Tr.S. 67-68) However, a buy could not be made and the detective
admitted that they lacked sufficient information to obtain a
search warrant.

(Tr.S. 68)

With respect to the effectuation of this plan,
Detective Blair testified:
Q. And that night as you saw him
drive by there was an opportunity to put
that plan or scenario into effect; is that
true?
A.

Yes.

Q. You expected him in town that
night because it was his habit, as far as
you knew, to come into town every Thursday
night, if that was a Thursday. Wednesday?
A.

Wednesday.

Q.

Wednesday night.

A.

Yes.

in

I'm a day behind.

Q. You knew it was his habit to come
into town about every Wednesday night?
A. Yes.
(Tr.S. 19)
These admissions of the existence of a plan to stop
appellant to

further

the

narcotics

investigation

were

also

expressed by Detective Blair.
Q. Are you telling this court, Mr.
Blair, that your intention of pulling him
over was simply to cite him for driving on
suspension? Is that your testimony?
A.

No, it's not.

Q. All right. You pulled him over
for far more than that, didn't you?
A.
Q.
right?

To meet him.
Was he a suspected drug dealer;

A. Yes.
Q.

You pulled him over to meet him?

A. Yes.
(Tr.S. 15)
This stop was a pretext to conduct further investigation on appellant by searching his vehicle.

In addition to the

detectives' statements that they hoped to find narcotics, the
circumstances surrounding the seizure of the vehicle corroborate
the conclusion that the inventory search was actually a pretext
to search for narcotics.

Appellant had pulled his vehicle into

a parking lot when the detectives signaled him to pull over.
(Tr.P. 81, Tr.S. 14, 48, Tr. 103)

After being placed under

arrest he requested the officers either to lock the vehicle and
leave it at the parking lot or to turn it over to his parents.

(Tr.S. 31f 56) Sergeant Groll denied both requests.
appellant the option

of having

the vehicle

He gave

inventoried and

towed from the parking lot or allowing Groll to drive it to the
Sheriff's office.

(Tr.P. 64, 69. Tr.S. 56)

After driving the

vehicle to the Sheriff's office, Groll then justified the inventory of the vehicle by claiming that it was necessary to protect
himself against false claims of theft.

(Tr.P. 59, 85, Tr. 110)

Essentially, the only choice that the detectives gave appellant
was to have his vehicle searched under the guise of an inventory.
These circumstances and admissions by the detectives
demonstrate that the search of appellant's vehicle was not a
legitimate exercise of the caretaking required of law officers
after they make a traffic arrest.

Rather, it was a pretext

to search appellant's vehicle to further their narcotics investigation.

This is especially obvious in light of the fact that

the detectives had been aware of appellant's suspended license
for several weeks but had chosen not to arrest him on previous
occasions for that

offense.

Thus, the

search violated

the

appellant's right against warrantless and unreasonable searches
and seizures as provided in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.

Consequently, the evidence seized as a result

of that search must be ordered to be suppressed.
B
THE DETECTIVES IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO FOLLOW
THE APPELLANT'S REQUEST REGARDING THE
DISPOSITION OF HIS VEHICLE, THUS MAKING THE
IMPOUND IMPROPER.

The officer's purported justification for the inventory search in the instant case was to protect appellant against
theft or loss and to protect themselves against false claims of
theft.

This has generally been referred to as the "caretaking"

function of the inventory search*
question had been parked

on the street and had been given

numerous parking violations.
plain sight in the car.

In Opperman, the vehicle in

Valuables had also been left in

The owner was neither available to dis-

pose of the car which was illegally parked nor was he present
at the time of impound.
The United States Supreme Court, nor this Court have
specifically addressed the issue of how to properly dispose of
an impounded automobile when the owner is present.

In State v*

Hygh, supra, this court held that the failure to follow departmental policies regarding advising a vehicle owner of impound
procedures taken in conjunction with other circumstances of the
arrest and search, constituted a pretext for an investigative
search.

Before law enforcement officers may claim that there

is a valid impound/ this court held that there must be a reasonable and proper justification stating:
[I]n order to support a finding that a valid
inventory search has taken place, the court
must first determine whether there was
reasonable and proper justification for the
impoundment of the vehicle. This justification and thus lawful impoundment, can be
had either through explicit statutory authorization or by the circumstances surrounding the initial stop. If impoundment was
"neither" authorized nor necessary, the
search was unreasonable.

Utah's statutes give a police department
authority to impound vehicles in several
situations. Vehicles may lawfully be
impounded when they are used to transport
controlled substances, U.C.A 1953f §58-3713; when the vehicle is improperly registered or stolen, U.C.A. 1953, §41-1-115; or
when a vehicle is abandoned, U.C.A. 1953,
§41-116.10. No specific statutory authority exists authorizing impound of a vehicle
stopped and parked on the street after the
driver has been arrested. Therefore, we
must look to the circumstances surrounding
the stop to determine whether the impound
was reasonable.
It is the burden of the State to establish
the necessity for the taking and the inventory of the vehicle. [Footnotes ommitted]
16 UAR at 12.
In Hygh the Salt Lake City Police Department had previously issued a departmental order to establish impound procedures when the owner of the vehicle was present.
to inventory

searches

conducted

when

With respect

the vehicle

owner

is

present, this court stated:
[W]e are not prepared to say that a true inventory search cannot be made in the presence
of the vehicle's owner and without his
consent. However, if the purpose of the
search is truly only to inventory the contents of the vehicle and to safeguard them
during impoundment, an indicia that such is
the real purpose of the search is to consult
with the owner of the vehicle when he is
present at the time of the impound and the
search. [Footnote ommitted] 16 UAR at
12-13.
Other courts have addressed this issue and have held,
generally, when the owner of the vehicle is available to make
arrangements for the care and custody of his vehicle after an
arrest for a traffic offense an impoundment and inventory of
the vehicle is not appropriate.

1 A

In State v. Bales, 15 Wash.

App. 834, 552 P.2d 688 (1976), the court specifically held that
following an arrest on a traffic charge, impoundment of the
vehicle is inappropriate when reasonable alternatives exist.
In that case the defendant had requested that the arresting
officers call a friend to pick up the car, but they did not do
so.

Likewise, in Arrington v. United States, 382 A.2d 14 (D.C.

App. 1978), the defendant was stopped next to a parked car and
was directed to move his car around the corner.

The police

moved the car to the police station after finding that the
defendant's license had been suspended.

The court held that

the police are authorized to impound a vehicle only if the
defendant consents or he is incapable of making other arrangements its disposition.
State v. LaRue, 368

So.2d

1048

(1979),

involved

a

situation wherein the defendant was arrested for driving under
the influence.
searched.

At the scene of the arrest, his automobile was

Among the factors that the court found that indicated

that this was not a proper inventory was the fact that the
defendant was not asked if there were valuables in the vehicle
or if he could make arrangements to have someone pick up the
vehicle.

Finally, in United States v. Pappas, 735 F.2d 1232

(10th Cir. 1984), officers for the Price City, Utah, police
department responded to a complaint of an assault with a firearm.
The officers stopped the defendant and made a limited search of
his vehicle in a private parking lot.
The defendant
impounded.

was placed

A firearm was located.

under arrest and his

vehicle was

During an impound search a sawed-off shotgun was

1 C

found.

The trial court held that the impound and subsequent

search of the defendant's vehicle violated his rights under the
Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the defendant should have
been given the opportunity to make other arrangements for the
care and custody of the vehicle.

The court stated:

The trial court correctly held that Opperman
cannot be used to justify the automatic
inventory of every car upon the arrest of
its owner. The justifications for the rule
are too carefully crafted for this to be
the intent. 732 F.2d at 1234.
In the instant case, Detective Blair testified that
appellant made several different requests for the disposition
of the vehicle.

He testified:

Q. I see.
Now, were you present
during the discussion at the scene of the
arrest where Mr. Rice asked if he could
just lock the vehicle and leave it there
behind the law office in the parking lot?
Did that discussion take place?
A.

I believe so.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Yes.

You heard it?

Q. And in response to that question
by Mr. Rice you or Mr. Groll instructed him
that you couldn't leave it there and it had
to be taken in to the police station; right?
A. No, I don't believe that was the
conversation.
Q.

But that it couldn't be left there?

A. I believe Sid said, "That's not
one of the choices."
Q.

"That's not one of the choices"?

A.

Yeah.

Q.

What

other

choices

did he give

him?
A. I believe he said he could have a
wrecker come and impound it or if he'd
like, Allen would like Sid to drive it to
the Sheriff's Office, and Allen said, "Yes,
you can drive it."
Allen asked if he could leave it
at his mother's place, and Sid said, "No,
that's not one of the"...
Q.

"That's not one of the choices"?

A. Yeah, choices.
(Tr.S. 30-31)
Although the issue in this case is slightly different
than that in Hygh, the legal principle that governs is the same.
In Hygh the officer failed to follow departmental procedures,
whereas, in the instant

case, appellant

requested

that his

vehicle be left in the custody of his mother or at the parking
lot where he was stopped.

(Tr.S. 31, 56)

The detectives later

testified that the area may not have been a safe place to leave
the vehicle (Tr.P. 69, Tr.S. 64), but obviously appellant was
willing to take that risk.

Appellant's parents lived in Logan

City and appellant lived there for a number of years, (Tr.S. 6,
53) so this is not a case where he was not aware of the circumstances and risks in leaving the vehicle in the lot.

This is

reinforced by the fact that his parents lived only several
blocks away.

(Tr.S. 23)

It would be safe to assume that the

vehicle would be moved from the lot within a matter of minutes.
Here, appellant was given only alternatives which would result
in an inventory of the vehicle. When these facts are considered
in conjunction with all of the other facts and circumstances

surrounding the arrest, the evidence indicates that the impound
was neither reasonable nor necessary

to protect appellant's

property or protect the detectives from false claims of theft.
Since the justifications for an inventory search of appellant's
vehicle are not applicable to this case, the search cannot be
justified as a legitimate impound. State v. Hyghf supra.

The

seizure of the contraband was made in violation of his rights
as guaranteed in the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the
Constitution of Utah.

Consequently, the evidence seized should

be ordered suppressed.
C
THE USE OF THE EVIDENCE UNLAWFULLY SEIZED
FROM APPELLANT WAS PREJUDICIAL, THUS REQUIRING A NEW TRIAL.
Appellant was charged
counts:

in an Information with three

Count I, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance

with Intent to Distribute for Value; Count II, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled
Suspension.

(R.

1)

Substance; and
The

substance

Count
that

III, Driving

was alleged

on

to be

possessed in Count I was four ounces of cocaine and in Count II
was a small container of marijuana.
in the search of the vehicle.

Both items were discovered

Without these substances there

is no evidence to support these two charges.

Consequently, the

introduction of the evidence at trial was prejudicial.

The

case should be remanded to the district court for a new trial
with an order prohibiting the use of the evidence which was
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illegally seized.
POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH
THAT THE APPELLANT POSSESSED COCAINE WITH
THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE FOR VALUE.
The standard by which this court reviews a criminal
conviction to determine if the evidence is sufficient to sustain
that conviction

has been

described

in a number

Recently, in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d

443

of

cases.

(Ut. 1983) , the

court held,
In considering that question, we review the
evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict of the jury.
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted. 659 P.2d at 444.
The court then went on to note the evidence must do
more than raise a mere speculation as to the defendant's guilt:
...we deem it desirable to emphasize that
notwithstanding the presumptions in favor
of the jury's decision this Court still has
the right to review the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the verdict. The fabric
of evidence against the defendant must cover
the gap between the presumption of innocence
and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment of
its duty to review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably be drawn
from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict, the reviewing court will stretch
the evidenctiary fabric as far as it will
go. But this does not mean that the court
can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain a verdict. The
evidence, stretched to its utmost limits,
must be sufficient to prove the defendant
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guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
at 444-445.

659 P.2d

Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(a)(ii) (1953 as amended)
makes the critical element of a felonious possession of a controlled substance the intent to distribute

for value.

This

intent requirement is the only element that distinguishes the
felony possession offense from a misdemeanor, unlawful possession of a controlled substance.5
As proof of this element, the State, in the instant
case, introduced the cocaine itself and opinion evidence of
three people:

the arresting detective, the technical services

officer from Logan City and a State narcotics investigator.
Each of those three offered the opinion that the appellant's
possession of the four ounces of cocaine was consistent with
the amounts that would be held by a "dealer".
535)

(Tr. 221, 332,

These individuals based their opinions on the quality of

the cocaine

involved,** the nature of the packaging

location of the package

in appellant's

vehicle.

and the

(Tr. 221,

372-375, 471-477) They had substantial disagreement about the
actual value of the cocaine.

Sergeant Groll testified that

each package could be valued at $2,000 to $2,500 (Tr. 267) and
the four packages together had a value of $15,000.
He also indicated

(Tr. 270)

that he was never aware of this quantity

5. The legislature has amended the penalties for unlawful
possession of cocaine to make that offense a third degree felony.
See Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(2)(b)(i) (1953 as amended).
6. Kent Glanville tested the four packages to contain 86% to
94% cocaine by weight.

on

being held for personal use.

(Tr. 270)

Agent Ron Flinders of

the State Narcotics and Liqour Law Enforcement indicated that
each of the four packages carried a value of $1,800 to $2,000
each.

(Tr. 525)

He felt the group of four packages had a

value of $4,000 to $5,000, as the price per unit goes up with
smaller quantities.

(Tr. 543)

The defense introduced expert testimony which indicated that an extremely "heavy" cocaine user could consume more
than ten grams of cocaine daily.

(Tr. 376, 470)

It was further

shown that individuals who "free base"7 cocaine would consume
even more than that.8
familiar with

(Tr. 470-471)

Sergeant Groll was not

the practice of "free basing", (Tr. 235) and

Agent Flinders felt that since "free basing" was generally done
in the house and since appellant was arrested in his vehicle
without "free basing" paraphelnalia he did not consider that
type use with respect to his opinion on appellant intent.

(Tr.

548) However, both defense experts indicated that it would be
consistent with "heavy" cocaine use to possess the amount held
by appellant at the time of his arrest. Such people would possess
that quantity for personal use rather than for sales.

(Tr.

379, 471)

7. Dr. Michael DeCaria described "free basing" as a process
where the user submits cocaine hydrochloride to a chemical
reaction which releases the hydrochloride ion from cocaine
hydrochloride leaving the "free base" cocaine which is then
smoked. (Tr. 465-467)
8. Dr. DeCaria testified that theoretically a human
consume up to 40 grams of cocaine per day. (Tr. 469)

could

Based on

this

conflicting

testimony/

the evidence

introduced on appellant's intent was so inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable doubt that
appellant committed the offense of unlawful possession of a
controlled substance

with

intent

to

distribute

for

value.

Consequently, the judgment and conviction for that offense must
be reversed and the case remanded to the district court with an
order to enter a judgment of acquittal.
CONCLUSION
The circumstances of appellant's arrest and the
procedures followed

in

the

seizure

of

appellant's

vehicle

indicate that the inventory of the vehicle was a pretext to
search that vehicle to further a narcotics investigation.

The

search of the vehicle cannot be justified as a lawful impound.
The evidence seized should therefore be suppressed and a new trial
ordered.

Due to the conflicting testimony on the issue of

appellant's intent, the evidence was insufficient to establish
the offense of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
with the intent to distribute for value.

Thus, in the alterna-

tive, appellant respectfully requests an order requiring the
district court to enter a judgment of acquittal.
Dated this

day of December, 1985.

RONALD J. YENGICH

G. FRED METOS

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed/deliverd to the
Attorney General's Office, at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah, 84114, on this

day of December, 1985.
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ADDENDUM

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden - Issuance
of warrant] . The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 (as amended)
41-1-115, Seizure of vehicles stolen, improperly
registered. The department or any peace officer, without a
warrant, may seize and take possession of any vehicle which is
being operated with improper registration, or which the department or the peace officer has reason to believe has been stolen,
or on which any motor number, manufacturer's number or identification mark has been defaced, altered or obliterated. Any
peace officer so seizing or taking possession of such vehicle
shall immediately notify the department of such action and
shall hold the vehicle until notified by the department as to
what further action should be taken regarding the disposition
of the vehicle.

ADDENDUM continued
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 (as amended)
41-12-32, Crimes and penalties . Failure to report
accident . False reports . Forged or unauthorized evidence or
proof of financial responsibility . Driving after suspension or
revocation of license or registration, or nonresident1s operating privilege*
(c) Any person whose license or registration or
nonresident's operating privilege has been suspended or revoked
under this act and who, during such suspension or revocation
drives any motor vehicle upon any highway or knowingly permits
any motor vehicle owned by such person to be operated by another
upon any highway, except as permitted under this act, shall be
fined not more than $299 or imprisoned not exceeding six months,
or both.
58-37-8. Prohibited acts - Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter,
unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:

it is

* * *

(ii) to distribute for value or possess with intent
to distribute for value a controlled or counterfeit substance;
*

•

•

(b) Any person who violates Subsection
respect to:

(l)(a) with

(i) a substance classified in Schedules I or II
is, upon conviction, guilty of a second degree felony and upon
a second or subsequent conviction of any provision of Subsection
(l)(a) is guilty of a first degree felony;
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was obtained
pursuant to a valid prescription or order or directly from a
practitioner while acting in the course of his professional
practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
*

*

•

ADDENDUM continued
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 (as amended)
58-37-8 continued
(b) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with
respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I and II,
or marihuana, is, upon conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony, except that if the amount of marihuana is over one
ounce but less than 16 ounces, that person is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor.
Upon a second or subsequent conviction of
possession of any controlled substance by a person having
previously been convicted pursuant to the provisions of this
Subsection (2)(b)(i), that person shall be sentenced to one
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2)(b)
(i);
(ii) all other controlled substances not included
in Subsection (2)(b)(i), including less than one ounce of
marihuana is, upon conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor,
and upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor, or upon a third or subsequent conviction
is guilty of a third degree felony.
58-37-13.
Procedure.

Property subject to forfeiture - Seizure -

(1) The following shall be subject to forfeiture and
no property right shall exist in them:
* * *

(e) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles or
vessels used or intended for use, to transport, or in any manner
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or
concealment of property described in (l)(a) or (l)(b) of this
section, except that:
(i) No conveyance used by any person as a common
carrier in the transaction of business as a common carrier
shall be forfeited under this section unless it appears that
the owner or other person in charge of the conveyance was a
consenting party or privy to violation of this act; and
(ii) No conveyance shall be forfeited under this
section by reason of any act or omission established by the
owner to have been committed or omitted without his knowledge
or consent; and

ADDENDUM continued
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953 (as amended)
58-37-13 continued
(iii) Any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a
bona fide security interest shall be subject to the interest of
the secured party upon the party's showing he could not have
known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation
would take place in the use of the conveyance.

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM DECISION

vs.
ALLEN F. RICE,

Criminal No.

3057

Defendant

The defendant has filed a Motion to Suppress Evidence
obtained in an inventory search of an automobile and seeks to
suppress on the basis this was a pretext search only.
The defendant has filed also a motion for release of property
namely a pistol and $2400.00 in case. Also a motion to discover
and inspect.

Since there was no opposition response filed to

this Motion it will be granted and the order signed.
It is not denied that the defendant was the subject of an
ongoing investigation in regard to the sale of controlled substances
and at the time of this instance was observed by the officers
driving a pickup truck.

The officers had prior knowledge the

defendant's drivers license was suspended and arrested him for
driving on suspension.

The defendant had pulled off into a

deserted parking lot at night with very little lighting, as all
business at that location had closed.
The defendant expressed concern for some property he had in
the back of this truck in the form of boxes or suitcases and asked
they be locked in the cab.
The officers then made the decision the car should be impounded
Mumboi

U»
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as it was in a high risk location with property of the defendant
to be protected.

There was discussions as to whether the car

should be towed to the police station or taken to the defendant's
parents place, about an equal distance as the police station.

The

officers told the defendant they would not take the truck to his
parents or allow him to drive the car as this would allow him to
commit another crime since he was on suspension.
The result was that the defendant elected to let one of the
officers drive his truck to the station while he rode in the
police car with the other officer.
Both sides cite and rely on South Dakota v. Opperman, 42 8
U.S. 364, 49 F.2nd 1000, a 1976 case.

Opperman notes their

basis for allowing an inventory search was one:
owners property in police custody; two:

to protect the

to protect the police

against claims of lost or stolen property; three:

to protect the

police from potential danger.
It does not appear the police were in any danger, but it does
appear there was valuable property of the defendant to be protected
in a high risk area, that the defendant had expressed concerns
about this property being protected.

It appears the officers

acted reasonable to protect the defendant's property.
Also, since the officer drives the car by himself to the
station, the property was in his sole possession from where the
defendant was stopped.

It appears that since the defendant had

expressed concern about his property and the car being in
possession of the officer for this period of time, it would not
seem unreasonable that he would request an inventory search to
avoid accusations of missing or damaged property.

5 7 PACE256

Defendant further urges that after a review of police
arrests for suspension, revocation or financial responsibility
that this defendant was picked on as far as being taken into custody.
On the record for arrests on suspensions in the Cache County Sheriff's
Office, on Page 8 of that report it shows that custody for such driving
was 81% in 1982, 80% in 1983, and 91% in 1984. This would certainly
not indicate that the defendant was an exception to being a
custodial arrest as opposed to those just being given a ticket.
It appears to this Court that under the facts and circumstances
the custodial arrest as well as the inventory search was reasonable.
The Constitution only protects the defendant from unreasonable
searches and under the circumstances just related the Court feels
this not to be an unreasonable search.

Simply the fact that the

defendant happened to be a person who was the subject of an ongoing
investigation concerning drugs should not prevent the officers from
proceeding with an arrest where the law is violated and an inventory
search where there seems to be a valid interest in protecting the
defendant's property as well as protecting the police interest against
false accusations.
Therefore, the Motion to Suppress is denied.
As to the Motion to Release the gun and money, the Court feels
this is a premature motion if it turns out after foundations being
made that this is not proper evidence, the motion might then be
a proper one, but at this point this is still a controverted fact
situation as to whether this is appropriate evidence.
Therefore, this motion will be denied.

Counsel for State

to prepare the appropriate order.
Dated this 3 AS (~ day of October 1984.
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